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BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE IN THE TIME
OF COVID-19: WHO SHOULD FOOT THE BILL?
Paul McHugh*
Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of
doing business in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a
tremendous potential cost in lives, money, and national
security.
– 9/11 Commission Report1
COVID-19-related business closures led to thousands of business
interruption insurance claims and lawsuits across the country.
However, throughout the history of business interruption policies,
obstacles such as virus exclusions and “physical damage”
requirements have been added in response to prior pandemics and
catastrophic losses. These exclusions and requirements have led to
many hurdles and outright denials for those seeking payment on
their policies. So, then, can business owners still find some
economic refuge in these policies? Despite outright denials in many
courts, at least a handful of federal judges as well as a number of
members of Congress seem to think so. Some courts have been using
traditional canons of contract interpretation to allow plaintiffs to
survive summary judgment motions on their claims, and there is a
federal push to pass legislation that would require coverage due to
COVID-19-mandated closures. This Note posits that any solution to
this economic fallout through business interruption insurance must
*
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consider the rational economic needs of insurers and incentivize
private capital investment to prevent any one industry—or in the
event of federal legislation, the taxpayer—from shouldering this
monumental burden.
INTRODUCTION
Business interruption insurance is a type of supplemental
insurance available to businesses which, unlike traditional property
insurance, covers losses beyond simple property damage and
includes such liabilities as lost profits, fixed operating costs, costs
associated with moving to temporary locations, and similar
unexpected expenses.2 It typically kicks in after natural disasters
such as fire, wind, or storms, or other events such as theft,
government-mandated closures, or terrorism, which result in
damage to a business, rendering it partially or wholly inoperable.3
This could include damage to warehouses, suppliers, or to
merchandise ready to ship, and is not confined to damage to
traditional brick and mortar shops.4 Today, nearly all business
interruption insurance policies require that there be physical damage
to the business before the insurance policy will pay out to the
policyholder.5
In the wake of ongoing COVID-19-related mandated closures,
claims by business owners on these policies have risen to record
breaking numbers.6 It is worth noting that the outcomes of business
2

Tyrone R. Childress et al., Time for a Policy Checkup: Maximizing
Insurance Coverage for Coronavirus Losses, JONES DAY (Feb. 2020), https://
www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/02/time-for-a-policy-checkup; What Is
Business Interruption Insurance?, NATIONWIDE, https://www.nationwide.com
/lc/resources/small-business/articles/what-is-business-interruption-insurance
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
3
What Is Business Interruption Insurance?, ALLSTATE (Nov. 2019), https://
www.allstate.com/tr/business-insurance/business-interruption-coverage.aspx.
4
Id.
5
Jennifer M. Oliver, Contractual Distancing: Pandemic Insurance
Litigation Spreads with Business Interruption Claim Denials, NAT’L L. REV.
(Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/contractual-distancingpandemic-insurance-litigation-spreads-business-interruption.
6
Maria Sassian, The Future of American Insurance and Reinsurance
Releases a Digital Business Interruption Insurance Explainer, INS. INFO. INST.
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interruption insurance will seemingly affect businesses of all sizes
at similar rates.7 Estimates state that approximately 33% of small
businesses have some form of business interruption insurance,
compared to about 35% for all businesses regardless of size.8
Similarly, although one may believe that larger industries are better
equipped to handle these losses, they are not immune from the
economic fallout either.9 Airlines, hospitality, retail and
entertainment industries have already seen bankruptcy filings, and
it is likely that we will continue to see bankruptcies and
restructurings absent significant change.10 This is clearly a concern
of the insurance industry generally, as evidenced by a statement
from a senior vice president of the National Association of Mutual
Insurance Companies (“NAMIC”), who stated: “no insurance
company or industry could cover the pandemic’s costs to businesses
and the economy—nor should the onus be primarily on insurers.”11
These business interruption claims have almost universally been
denied, with some insurers even preemptively stating they will not

(Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/the-future-ofamerican-insurance-and-reinsurance-releases-a-digital-business-interruptioninsurance-explainer/. There were over 800 lawsuits filed in the United States in
2020 seeking coverage for business interruption insurance as a result of COVID19. Cecelia Lockner et al., COVID-19 Business Interruption Suits: An Overview
of Decisions to Date, JD SUPRA (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com
/legalnews/covid-19-business-interruption-suits-an-41312/.
7
Thomas Wade, Coronavirus and Business Interruption Insurance
Coverage,
AM .
ACTION
FORUM
(Apr.
14,
2020),
https://
www.americanactionforum.org/insight/coronavirus-and-business-interruptioninsurance-coverage/.
8
Id.; U.S. House Introduces Business Interruption Insurance Bills for Small
Businesses, CLUB INDUS. (May 5, 2020), https://www.clubindustry.com/news/us-house-introduces-business-interruption-insurance-bills-for-small-businesses.
9
Michael J. Bowe & Lauren Tabaksblat, You Can’t Sue a Germ: Comparing
the 2008 Financial Crash to the COVID-19 Economic Crisis, BROWN RUDNICK
(June
25,
2020),
http://brownrudnick.com/article/you-cant-sue-a-germcomparing-the-2008-financial-crash-to-the-covid-19-economic-crisis/.
10
Id.
11
Karen Epper Hoffman, Business Interruption: Insurers Balk at Paying
Claims, CFO (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.cfo.com/risk-management/2020/09
/pandemic-losses-out-in-the-cold/.
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cover COVID-19-related business interruption claims.12 Tom
Baker, a University of Pennsylvania law professor, has been
researching business interruption cases since the start of the
pandemic, and noted that approximately three out of every four
cases brought by businesses seeking payment on their policies have
been dismissed at the pleadings stage.13 Unsurprisingly, such wide
scale insurance denial at a time of global economic strife, with
potentially hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, has led to a surge
in litigation surrounding the issue.14 As of the first week of August
2020, there have been over 800 lawsuits filed on the issue of
business interruption insurance, a number that exceeds the lawsuits
filed on this issue as a result of hurricanes Sandy, Irma, and Harvey
combined.15 Estimates of potential losses facing the insurance
industry vary wildly, with investment bank Berenberg projecting
$50 billion to $70 billion, Lloyd’s estimating $107 billion,16 and the
American Property Casualty Insurance Association (“APCIA”)
estimating between $255 billion and $431 billion per month.17
Whatever the actual amount may turn out to be, it is clear that in
“what is expected to be one of the greatest domestic and global

12

Erin Shaak, Class Action: State Farm Has ‘Preemptively Denied’ COVID19 Business Interruption Claims, CLASSACTION (June 26, 2020), https://
www.classaction.org/news/class-action-state-farm-has-preemptively-deniedcovid-19-business-interruption-claims#embedded-document.
13
Jef Feeley & Katherine Chiglinksky, Insurers Winning Most, but Not All,
COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits, INS. J. (Nov. 30, 2020), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/11/30/592047.htm.
14
Michael Bentivegna, Update: Business Interruption Claims Due to
COVID-19, EISNERAMPER (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.eisneramper.com
/business-interruption-claims-covid-19-0820/.
15
Id.
16
Jeff Dunsavage, COVID-19 & Beyond: Study Highlights Claims Trends,
INS. INFO. INST. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/covid19-beyond-study-highlights-claims-trends/.
17
Eileen Gilligan, APCIA Releases Update to Business Interruption
Analysis, AM. PROP. CASUALTY INS. ASS’N (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.apci.org
/media/news-releases/release/60522/. See also Susanne Sclafane, P/C Insurers
Back a Federal Pandemic Loss Fund but Not a Backstop like TRIA, INS. J. (May
19, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2020/05/19/569115
.htm.
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economic loss events in history,”18 there is incentive and
determination on the part of the insurance industry to fight these
claims however possible.19
Crucially, many of these lawsuits turn on whether there has been
“physical loss” or “physical damage,” a requirement of the vast
majority of these policies.20 Insurers have been arguing the perhaps
common-sense notion that there has been no physical damage as a
result of government-mandated closures and, therefore, the denial of
coverage is plainly justified.21 This line of reasoning has been
successful in a number of cases. It was recently exemplified in the
Washington, D.C. Superior Court case Rose’s 1, LLC et al. v. Erie
Insurance Exchange, where the court granted summary judgment to
Erie Insurance Exchange, asserting that it need not pay out on a
business interruption claim because, absent the presence of COVID19, there could be no “physical damage” as required by the
insurance contract.22 The court reasoned that government-mandated
shutdown orders did not entitle the insured to coverage absent a
direct physical damage to the property, and that the insured in this
case did not provide any evidence that COVID-19 was physically
present in their businesses.23 This is in contrast, however, to other
lower court rulings on the exact same issue.24 In North State Deli,
LLC v. The Cincinnati Insurance Company, a North Carolina
Superior Court grappled with the definition of “direct physical
loss.”25 The court ultimately determined that to hold the term to
require literal physical damage would “conflate[] ‘physical loss’ and
18

Hoffman, supra note 11.
See, e.g., Turek Enters., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 484 F.
Supp. 3d 492 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Circus Circus LV, LP v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co.,
No 2:20-cv-01240-JAD-NJK, 2021 WL 769660 (D. Nev. Feb. 26, 2021), appeal
docketed, No. 21-15367 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2021).
20
Wade, supra note 7.
21
Bentivegna, supra note 14.
22
See Rose’s 1, LLC v. Erie Ins. Exch., No. 2020 CA 002424 B, 2020 WL
4589206, at *4–5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2020).
23
Id. at 5.
24
See, e.g., North State Deli, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20-CVS02569, 2020 WL 6281507 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2020); Gregory Packaging,
Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., Civ. No. 2:12-CV-04418, 2014 WL
6675934 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014).
25
North State Deli, 2020 WL 6281507, at *3.
19

496

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

‘physical damage.’”26 To rectify this perceived issue, the court held
that “direct physical loss” applies to “the inability to utilize or
possess something in the real, material, or bodily world,” and that
such a definition logically applies to extend coverage to situations
where business owners are prevented from using their property, such
as in the case of government-mandated closures.27
As evidenced above, courts are split as to what satisfies the
“physical loss or damage” requirement, and in some instances,
whether that requirement can be upheld at all.28 Courts in some
jurisdictions have held that contaminants and other circumstances
that make property constructively unusable can be sufficient to
constitute a physical loss, focusing more on the “loss” rather than
the “damage.”29 Plaintiffs may also be able to argue that a virus is
in fact itself a physical harm causing damage to their business.30
Depending on the court, however, this may prove to be a losing
argument.31 Many federal district courts have rejected this
argument, some rather passionately.32 In one opinion from the
Southern District of New York, denying a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court stated that “coronavirus damages lungs. It

26

Id.
Id.
28
Barclay Richard Nicholson & Peyton L. Craig, COVID-19 and Business
Interruption Claims: The Looming US Battle Ahead, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge
/publications/96a8191e/covid-19-and-business-interruption-claims-the-loomingus-battle-ahead.
29
Childress, supra note 2.
30
See, e.g., Gregory Packing Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., Civ.
No. 2:12-CV-04418, 2014 WL 6675934, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (finding
that an ammonia discharge inflicted damage to Gregory Packaging’s Facility).
31
See, e.g., Sandy Point Dental, PC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 20 CV 2160,
2020 WL 5630465, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2020) (holding that closure due to
COVID-19, especially without proof of the virus’s physical presence, is
insufficient to satisfy a showing of “physical harm,” a prerequisite for insurance
coverage).
32
Id. (citing, inter alia, decisions from the Southern District of New York,
Western District of Texas, and Superior Court of the District of Columbia holding
that coronavirus does not amount to physical loss).
27
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doesn’t damage printing presses.”33 This holding, and indeed this
very quotation, have been cited favorably in numerous other district
court decisions as well.34
These variations in what may constitute a loss for purposes
sufficient to trigger business interruption insurance mean the
analysis is one that is fact-specific, and this issue may be one reason
we have seen such a large volume in litigation—particularly since
the fact-specific nature of these cases may make consolidation
impractical or impossible.35 However, many plaintiffs still face an
uphill battle. In the aftermath of the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak,
many insurers added explicit virus exclusions into their business
interruption policies.36 Even though some courts, as well as pending
legislation in Congress,37 have advanced policy reasons to ignore
this exclusion, because of the exclusion’s own unambiguous terms
as well as the insured’s implicit assent to the terms of their policy,
many courts have summarily rejected plaintiffs’ claims seeking
payment on these policies.38
There may also be hope for some plaintiffs to succeed on their
claims through the basic principles of contract law.39 Federal trial
courts in a number of states have applied this basic framework when
analyzing whether a virus exclusion applies to COVID-19 related
claims.40 In the case of Urogynecology Specialist of Florida, LLC v.
33

Sandy Point Dental, 2020 WL 5630465, at *3 (citing Social Life
Magazine, Inc. v. Sentinel Ins. Co. Ltd., No. 20 C 3311 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)).
34
See, e.g., id.
35
Childress, supra note 2.
36
John DiMugno, The Implications of COVID-19 for the Insurance Industry
and Its Customers, 32 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2020).
37
See Business Interruption Insurance Coverage Act of 2020, H.R. 6494,
116th Cong. (2020); Never Again Small Business Protection Act of 2020, H.R.
6497, 116th Cong. (2020).
38
Tyrone R. Childress, Matthew L. Jacobs & Jason B. Lissy, COVID-19
Ruling Serves as Cautionary Tale for Policyholders to Satisfy Pleading
Requirements, JONES DAY (July 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights
/2020/07/covid19-ruling-serves-as-cautionary-tale-for-policyholders-to-satisfypleading-requirements.
39
See Urogynecology Specialist of Fla. LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 6:20CV-1174-Orl-22EJK, 2020 WL 5939172, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2020).
40
See e.g., id.; Turek Enterprises, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 484
F. Supp. 3d 492, 499 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Martinez v. Allied Ins. Co. of Am., 483
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Sentinel Insurance Company, LTD, this meant an analysis as to
whether the included virus provision was ambiguous, with any
genuine ambiguity weighing in favor of covering the claim as a
matter of public policy, or at the very least allowing the claim to
survive a summary judgment motion.41 There, the virus exclusion at
issue stated that it did not cover “loss or damage caused directly or
indirectly by the presence, growth, proliferation, spread, or any
activity of ‘fungi, wet rot, dry rot, bacteria, or virus.’”42 The court
determined that the enumerated exclusions of fungi, wet rot, and dry
rot did not logically follow to also include COVID-19, as they were
materially different, and subsequently denied Sentinel’s motion to
dismiss.43 This is a significant win for plaintiffs looking to enforce
their business interruption policies because it suggests that, despite
the inclusion of what might be considered a catchall exclusion for
viruses, other qualifying terms or exclusions may limit their scope.44
Although this holding does not mean that plaintiffs will ultimately
be paid on their insurance policies, it does give them ammunition to
survive a motion for summary judgment, making it all the more
likely that they may be able to get their case before a jury, where
they will likely benefit at least in some small way as the more
sympathetic party.45
Part I of this Note examines the current proposed federal
legislation in the United States Congress. It discusses the attempts
by Congress to cover COVID-19-related business interruption
claims and their potential shortfalls, especially as it relates to
insurers’ unchecked ability to increase premiums on those
policies.46 Part II of this Note then analyzes the way these same
F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1191 (M.D. Fla. 2020); 10E, LLC v. Travelers Indem. Co. of
Conn., 483 F. Supp. 3d 828, 835 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (applying basic contract
principles in determining viability of COVID-19-related business insurance
claims).
41
Urogynecology Specialist of Fla., 2020 WL 5939172, at *3.
42
Id. at *4.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See H.R. 6494, 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing to limit the ability to
increase insurance premiums); H.R. 6497, 116th Cong. (2020) (proposing
optional coverage by insurers covering viral pandemics).
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goals have manifested themselves into bills at the state level. It
examines the large overlap in the federal and state approaches, while
noting the exception that several states have added more specificity
in terms of exact dollar caps.47 Part III then analyzes the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”) which was passed in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001.48 This
Act has enjoyed considerable political support and is currently a
contender for the basis of any COVID-19 related insurance bill, so
this Note will discuss where it has been successful, and in what areas
it has fallen short.49 Next, Part IV examines the approach to business
interruption insurance taken up in the wake of the 2002 SARS
outbreak. As is still seen today, much of the debate there was
centered on the issue of “physical” damage.50 This outbreak is also
largely what led insurers to include virus exclusions in these
contracts, so the historical context here will provide insight into the
needs of both the insured and the insurers.51
Finally, Part V proposes a blend of the most promising aspects
of currently proposed federal and state bills, as well as the proven
effective portions of TRIA. This proposal includes a call for a
federal act to mandate business interruption coverage where
businesses were forced to close either through governmentmandated closures or directly from COVID-19 itself. Such a bill
should be retroactive to March 1, 2020, and as the New York
assembly thoughtfully considered, should permit those who were
covered as of that date, but let their policies expire, to reinstate those
policies at the same costs they were paying as of March 1, 2020.52 It
should further seek to address the potential issues with H.R. 6494
and H.R. 649753 by still permitting insurers to raise premiums with
47

See, e.g., A10226B, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2020); S.B.
477, 2020 Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).
48
See DiMugno, supra note 36, at 20–21 (discussing the history and key
provisions of TRIA).
49
Id.
50
See Charles S. LiMandri et al., Pandemic of Coverage Litigation for
Business Income Losses Due to Coronavirus Plagues Insurance Industry, 32 CAL.
INS. L. & REG. REP. 1 (2020).
51
DiMugno, supra note 36, at 1–3.
52
See N.Y. Assem. B. A10226B.
53
See discussion infra Part I.
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the goal of recuperating some of their losses.54 However, it should
require an independent actuarial organization such as the Academy
for Actuaries to determine the level of such an increase, which in no
event should meet or exceed the cost of the claims.55 Just as was
created in TRIA, a proposed solution to this issue in relation to
COVID-19 should also require a federal backstop mechanism to
cover insurance industry losses over a specified cap.56 Lastly, the act
should seek to incentivize private investment capital in the insurance
industry by creating a period in which individuals and equity funds
could invest directly into insurance companies, with those
investments not subjected to the capital gains tax.
I. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. H.R. 6494
Introduced on April 14, 2020, H.R. 6494 is currently before the
United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial
Services.57 The bill, alternatively known as the “Business
Interruption Insurance Coverage Act of 2020,” is sponsored by
Representative Mike Thompson and is currently co-sponsored by
nine other members of Congress, all of whom are Democrats.58 As
its name implies, the purpose of the bill is to include business
interruption due to virus pandemics and mandated business closures
among the claims covered by business interruption insurance.59 The
bill takes a strong stance in favor of the insured by requiring that all
insurers who offer business interruption insurance shall include
coverage in their policies for “any viral pandemic . . . forced closure
of businesses, or mandatory evacuation . . . [or] power shut-off
conducted for public safety purposes . . . .”60 The bill then aims to
squarely tackle the issue as it relates to COVID-19 by voiding any

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

See H.R. 6494, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 6497, 116th Cong. (2020).
See H.R. 6494, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 6497, 116th Cong. (2020).
DiMugno, supra note 36, at 20.
H.R. 6494.
Id. § 1.
Id.
Id. § 2.
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exemptions currently in effect as of the date of the Act’s enactment
that conflict with the required coverages enumerated in Section 2.61
H.R. 6494 § 2 states in part:
Effective upon the date of the enactment of this Act,
each insurer that offers or makes available business
interruption insurance coverage . . . shall make
available, in all of its policies providing business
interruption insurance, coverage for losses resulting
from—
(A) any viral pandemic;
(B) any forced closure of businesses, or mandatory
evacuation, by law or order of any government or
governmental officer or agency, including the
Federal Government and State and local governments; or
(C) any power shut-off conducted for public safety
purposes.62
It further explicitly denies states the right to approve any of the
aforementioned exclusions in business interruption insurance.63 If
there is any consolation in this bill for the insurance industry, it is
found in Section 3(C)(2).64 This section permits insurers to reinstate
provisions that exclude coverage outlined in Section 2(1) “if the
insured fails to pay any increased premium charged by the insurer
for providing such business interruption insurance.”65 Notably, the
bill does not cap or otherwise instruct the amount insurers are
permitted to raise premiums as a result and fails to further flesh out
how this process might work, raising questions such as whether an
insurer could, consistent with H.R. 6494, simply raise the premium
by the amount (or just under the amount) of the claim, and then
refuse to pay out unless that increased premium is met.66 Such an
act would clearly go against the public policy purpose of the bill, but

61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. §§ 2–3.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Act’s own terms nonetheless imply some support that these very
actions may be permissible.67
B. H.R. 6497
There are a number of similar bills also before the House
Committee on Financial Services, such as H.R. 6497, also known as
the Never Again Small Business Protection Act of 2020.68 This bill,
sponsored by Pennsylvania Republican Representative Brian
Fitzpatrick, was introduced on the same day as H.R. 6494.69 It
currently has six cosponsors and enjoys bipartisan support, unlike
H.R. 6494.70 Also unlike H.R. 6494, H.R. 6497 does not seek to
mandate that insurers include coverage for viral pandemics, orders
of federal or state governments, and the like, but rather only
mandates that they offer coverage for these incidents as optional
additional coverage.71 However, the bill has the same exceptions to
the mandate, as does H.R. 6494, in that it allows insurers to deny
such coverage in the presence of an affirmative written statement
from the insured authorizing the exclusion of such coverage or in
the event that the insured fails to pay any additional premium for the
coverage.72 In this way, both bills are susceptible to the same
criticism—that they fail to cap or otherwise guide the application of
additional fees, raising the concern that these additional fees could
be equal to, or nearly equal to, the amount of the claim itself, thereby
eliminating any potential benefit to the insured.73 Interestingly,
despite the proposed bill’s name, it makes no mention or specific
effort to target small businesses in particular.74
67

Id.
H.R. 6497, 116th Cong. § 1 (2020).
69
Id.; Press Release, Brian Fitzpatrick, Fitzpatrick, Cisneros, Hurd, Suozzi
Introduce Landmark Bipartisan Business Interruption Insurance Bill to Protect
Small Businesses (Apr. 24, 2020) (on file with author); see also H.R. 6494.
70
H.R. 6497; Press Release, Brian Fitzpatrick, Fitzpatrick, Cisneros, Hurd,
Suozzi Introduce Landmark Bipartisan Business Interruption Insurance Bill to
Protect Small Businesses (Apr. 24, 2020) (on file with author).
71
H.R. 6497 § 2.
72
Id. § 4.
73
Compare H.R. 6497, with H.R. 6494.
74
H.R. 6497.
68
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However, the bill goes far beyond simply creating an option to
purchase business interruption insurance under circumstances such
as those posed by COVID-19.75 As outlined in Sections 5 and 6, it
directs the Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance established by
the Secretary of the Treasury to “conduct a study regarding the
effectiveness and efficiency of using a [f]ederal backstop
mechanism, private equity pools, risk assessments, and market
pricing to reinsure insurers for excessive losses under coverage
made available pursuant to Section 2 of this Act,” to be concluded
within 180 days of the bill’s enactment.76 Depending on the findings
of such a study, this means that the government could wind up
reinsuring insurers above a certain monetary threshold, or encourage
private funds to act as a type of investor, or reinsurer, of the
insurance industry. Such a program is certainly beneficial to the
insurance industry and may in fact be required to prevent
bankruptcies or insolvencies, but when liability estimates range
from as low as $50 billion77 to as high as $431 billion per month,78
the federal government could be left on the hook for limitless
liability that seems difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly
estimate.
II. PROPOSED STATE LEGISLATION
There are currently at least eight state legislatures that have also
introduced legislation aimed at combating the issue of COVID-19
coverage under business interruption insurance.79 All eight of these

75

Id.
Id. § 5.
77
Dunsavage, supra note 16.
78
Jef Feeley & Katherine Chiglinsky, Monthly Loss of $431 Billion Spurs
Insurance Claims Across the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2020), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/monthly-loss-of-431-billionspurs-insurance-claims-across-u-s.
79
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, INSURANCE UPDATE: LEGISLATIVE,
REGULATORY AND LITIGATION ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. IN RESPONSE TO COVID19: DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION AND AUTO INSURANCE 5 (2020), https://www.sullcrom.com/files
/upload/SC-Publication-COVID-19-Insurance-Developments-BusinessWorkers-Compensation-Auto.pdf.
76
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states—Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina—currently have
some form of proposed legislation that seeks to expand business
interruption insurance to businesses affected by COVID-19 and
eliminate denials based on a lack of traditional “physical loss or
damage.”80 Many of these bills also explicitly state that upon
ratification, they would become retroactive to March 2020.81 The
majority of the proposed bills also provide that the amount a
business may receive in relief is the same as the upper limits of their
original policy.82 Although the states do not have the same level of
capital available as the federal government, those state bills that
provide for a funding mechanism operate similarly to the proposed
federal backstop mechanism.83 However, instead of reimbursing
insurers over a specified cap, they would reimburse the insurers
proportional to the scope of their business in the state.84
These proposed bills are essentially the same in goal and in
approach as the federal bills, but there are some noteworthy
differences. In New York, for example, bill A 10226 would provide
that should a business interruption insurance policy expire during a
state of emergency, the policy would automatically be renewed at
its current rate.85 In the Louisiana Senate, S.B. 506, a supplemental
COVID-19 related bill, would also allow the insured to purchase
plans that include disinfecting places of business where individuals
have had a positive diagnosis for COVID-19, up to ten cents per
square foot.86 This is significant because it is one of the only
proposed pieces of legislation in the business interruption insurance
sphere that puts an exact amount on the proposed relief.87
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III. TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
United States Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
(“TRIA”), which is a form of federal reinsurance of the insurance
industry, capping their terrorism-related losses at $100 billion from
a terrorist act.88 Furthermore, prior to reaching the $100 billion cap,
the federal government will also pay 80% of a claim for the portion
that is in excess of the aggregate amount of claims of the entire
insurance industry, plus the claimant’s individual deductible.89 The
currently proposed Pandemic Risk Insurance Act is substantially
similar in approach to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, and
appears to be the approach with the most political support behind it
to date.90 Being that it may very well be the outline for a new
national emergency, it is important to note the congressional
findings that led to its enactment, as well as what economic
successes TRIA has managed to accomplish to make it so politically
popular nearly two decades later.
Unsurprisingly, many of the congressional findings from the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act can logically be applied to any
forthcoming COVID-19 related insurance legislation. Congress
found that the existence of a functioning insurance market is crucial
to economic growth, urban development, housing, and trade.91 It
further found that the ability of insurance companies to cover risks
from terrorist attacks can be a crucial factor in the economic
recovery post-attack.92 It is easy to imagine that such logic could be
applied to viral pandemics as well since common sense would
appear to dictate that a strong insurance industry, sufficiently able
to cover legitimate claims, would aid in the recovery from any large
scale economic disaster, regardless of the source.
It should also be noted that TRIA is not without its critics, many
of whom are from the insurance industry itself.93 This is largely due
88
89
90
91
92

DiMugno, supra note 36, at 20.
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Id. at 20–21.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. § 101(a)(3)
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to the fact that TRIA does not act like traditional reinsurance.94
Specifically, TRIA creates a system which only takes effect after a
triggering event, rather than before.95 This allows the federal
government to allocate less funding to the program and is typically
more efficient, because by the time the federal government pays out,
it has an idea of the exact cost of the damage it is replacing.96 While
this all works well in theory, it does place the majority of the upfront
financial burden on the insurance industry.97 This is because the
insurance industry itself is the first payor in the event of catastrophic
loss, requiring its constituents to have large capital available to meet
potential demand.98
Two major insurer trade organizations, the National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies (“NAMIC”) and the American
Property Casualty Insurance Association (“APCIA”), have openly
spoke about their concerns over modeling any pandemic-related
program after TRIA.99 They have distinguished the effects of
COVID-19 from terrorist events, stating: “[t]he pandemic risk is
fundamentally different from a terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks, as
awful as they are, do have limits in geography. They have limits in
scope and frequency. This pandemic would be like having 9/11
every day for 60 or 90 days.”100
Insurers further distinguish between their approaches to these
catastrophes, warning that while the typical, risk-based strategy is
appropriate for mitigating harm after terrorist events, the same
cannot be said for pandemics like COVID-19.101 They claim that
these normally utilized practices would be detrimental to the public
health in the case of a pandemic.102 They state, for example, that
94

Wendy Peters, 5 Key Questions About Terrorism Insurance (TRIA),
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insurers normally charge higher rates to those that are higher risk,
but that this is not an option in relation to COVID-19 since the risk
has already been realized.103 One method they could use to minimize
liability would be to incentivize businesses to continue to operate,
although in many situations this would be directly at odds with the
public interest or even perhaps federal or state law.104
The Academy for Actuaries, in contrast to NAMIC and APCIA,
largely supports the premise of a TRIA-like COVID-19 relief act.105
Their support, however, is not without some criticisms as well.106 It
specifically criticized the idea that the federal government might
require “actuarially determined premiums for insurers to pay to the
government for reinsurance.”107 The concern here is that there is not
a reasonable enough degree of specificity to determine the actuarial
cost of these claims.108 They worry that this could require insurers
to pay huge sums of money to the government based on flimsy
accounting principles, for claims that may not even arise for years
or even decades, which would naturally be an inefficient allocation
of capital during a time when relief funds are needed desperately for
many.109 There is also the concern that natural market forces will
play a role in any action that Congress inevitably decides to take and
that in the event loss is excessively placed on the shoulders of the
insurance industry, it will likely make up for those loses by
increasing insurance rates.110
IV. THE 2002 SARS OUTBREAK AND ITS LASTING EFFECTS ON
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE
Following the 2002 SARS outbreak and the extensive ensuing
litigation, many insurance companies added explicit virus and
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bacteria exclusions into their business interruption policies.111 The
first of such exclusions was introduced in 2006 by the Insurance
Services Office (“ISO”).112 While seeking regulatory approval for
the exclusion, the ISO specifically mentioned SARS as a reason for
adding the exclusion; however, they also made sure to state that
“[t]he universe of disease-causing organisms is always in
evolution,” and as such, that the exclusion should not be limited
solely to SARS.113 The argument that the insurance industry meant
for this inclusion to cover diseases like COVID-19 is even stronger
when one notes that COVID-19, caused by SARS-CoV-2, is
actually related to the virus that causes SARS-CoV,114 seemingly
falling exactly into the type of “evolution” contemplated by the
ISO.115
Still, not all policies contain such an exclusion. But that has not
deterred many insurers from refusing to pay out on bacteria and
virus-related claims.116 In cases where no such virus exclusion
exists, insurers have been known to seek refuge through pollution
exclusions.117 Courts are reluctant to find that bacteria falls under
the pollution exclusion;118 however at least one court—the Southern
111

See, e.g., Larry Podoshen, New Endorsements Filed to Address Exclusion
of Loss Due to Virus or Bacteria, INS. SERV. OFF. (July 6, 2006), https://
www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/files/2020/03/ISO-Circular-LI-CF2006-175-Virus.pdf (providing, in relevant part, that the insurer “will not pay for
loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other
microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or
disease”).
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Yujiro Toyoshima et al., SARS-CoV-2 Genomic Variations Associated
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District of Florida—has held that it does.119 Regardless, after
dealing with the losses incurred from SARS, virus exclusions are by
far the norm today in business interruption insurance.120
Even in cases where virus exclusions are explicitly written into
business interruption insurance contracts, at least some courts are
willing to ignore such exclusions.121 However, even where courts
are willing to ignore these exclusions, or where they did not exist in
the original insurance contract, there has still been another major
hurdle for those seeking to be paid out on these policies—the
“physical loss or damage requirement.”122 This requirement is
typically in contemplation of natural disasters such as hurricanes,
fires, or earthquakes.123 It is unclear whether a virus that can “live
on surfaces for up to four days” is sufficient to state a claim for
“physical loss or damage.”124 Regardless, although there is debate
as to how courts will interpret the “physical loss or damage”
requirement, there is a body of case law to suggest that many may
find that the presence of COVID-19 satisfies such a requirement.125
For example, in Cooper v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Illinois, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that
the presence of E. coli in a bar was sufficient for the purposes of the
“physical damage” inquiry.126 Logic seems to dictate that if the
presence of E. coli is sufficient for a finding of “physical loss or
damage,” then the presence of COVID-19 would be sufficient.
Support for this contention exists throughout several of the federal
circuit courts. The First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have all
affirmed cases finding the prerequisite “physical damage” without
119
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the literal, traditional use of the phrase.127 In these cases, there was
no physical damage to the structure of the business itself.128 There
are, of course, numerous cases that suggest just the opposite—that
literal damage to property is required—suggesting that, at least for
now, whether or not an insured can recover on their claim may very
well come down to which court they find themselves in.129
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AMALGAMATE CURRENT BILLS,
DETER ABUSE, AND DIVERSIFY CURRENT LOSSES IN
ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE EARNINGS
The groundwork laid by federal bills H.R. 6494 and H.R. 6497,
as well as the numerous state bills, is commendable and an excellent
framework for the legislation that should ultimately emerge to
address the COVID-19 pandemic as it relates to business
interruption insurance, but these efforts are not beyond reproach.130
As discussed previously, many of these bills are susceptible to abuse
127

See Essex Ins. Co. v. BloomSouth Flooring Corp., 562 F.3d 399, 406 (1st
Cir. 2009) (losses from odor in defective carpeting were caused by physical injury
to property); Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226,
235–36 (3d Cir. 2002) (losses from large quantities of asbestos in the air of a
building can be sufficient for a finding of physical damage); TRAVCO Ins. Co.
v. Ward, 715 F. Supp. 2d 699, 709 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d, 504 F. App’x. 251 (4th
Cir. 2013) (losses resulting from defective drywall, even when fully intact and
functional, were caused by “loss of use of tangible property” constituting
“property damage”); By Dev., Inc. v. United Fire & Cas. Co., No. Civ. 04-5116,
2006 WL 694991, at *4–6 (D.S.D. Mar. 14, 2006), aff’d sub nom, 206 F. App’x
609 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the presence of bacteria and other non-traditional
forms of “physical damage” may be sufficient to meet the physical loss or damage
requirement).
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in that they fail to meaningfully limit increased premiums and policy
costs, or impose specific dollar amounts in all relevant areas
including federal or state backstop caps, or the amount to be
received by the insured.131 Perhaps most significantly, these bills
would put significant financial strain on both the insurance industry
and the federal and state governments that seek to cap their losses.132
Many of these proposed funding mechanisms are simply a version
of a tax and spend plan, which makes little sense given that hundreds
of thousands of businesses are shut down, people are out of work,
and these plans would essentially have those fortunate enough—but
largely still struggling—to foot a significant portion of the bill,
while also still leaving insurance companies extraordinarily
vulnerable.133 While financial strain across all sectors of the United
States economy is likely inevitable in the wake of COVID-19, that
does not prevent us from attempting to ameliorate such
difficulties.134 The most efficient way to do this is to spread the costs
among as many people and corporations as possible, while creating
incentive and opportunity to share in the post-COVID economic
gains. It is for these reasons that any final federal bill seeking to
address these problems should: (1) require insurers to cover
COVID-19 business interruption claims regardless of physical
damage, especially in cases of government-mandated closures; (2)
be retroactive to March 1, 2020; (3) allow insurers to increase
premiums to recover some of their losses, subject to an
independently and actuarially determined percentage cap that in no
event shall be equal to or exceed the amount of the claim; (4) permit
the federal and state governments to create backstop programs
covering insurance sector losses above a specific dollar amount to
131
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be determined by a Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance
established by the Secretary of the Treasury, which would be limited
to COVID-19-related loses and would terminate after such claims
have been settled; and (5) create incentive for private sector
investment by creating a window for investments into these
corporations, the profits of which would not be subject to the capital
gains tax. These measures, taken together, will help address the
substantial economic need to keep businesses open and insurers
solvent, all while deterring abuse and minimizing the losses on any
one sector—especially the federal government.135 The federal
government can benefit from all the savings it can reasonably
expect, in order to help alleviate the burden of COVID-19 in other
meaningful areas as well.136
A. Scope of Coverage
It is clear that the United States and insurance companies alike
have a substantial interest in making sure that these business
interruption insurance claims are paid out, and in a way that is
financially viable for all parties involved.137 With roughly 100,000
small businesses already closed for good138 and as many as 7.5
million businesses at risk of closing permanently,139 it is clear that
continued loss of business and the subsequent increase in
unemployment—which more than tripled during the pandemic to
over 20 million unemployed as of May of 2020—could have a
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devastating effect on the economy.140 Additionally, although
insurance companies certainly have an interest in not paying out on
their claims, doing so could devastate millions of shuttered
businesses, which harms insurance companies in the long run
because they lose millions of potential customers.141 Further still,
business interruption insurance is in almost all cases a form of
supplemental insurance to an existing property insurance policy—
business owners with such policies typically pay extra for this
coverage beyond simple property insurance and as such are
disproportionately likely to be desired customers for insurance
agencies.142 These economic incentives, coupled with the sheer
quantity of legislation aimed at tackling this issue, make it clear that
there is a compelling, widespread interest in addressing it, and doing
so in the most effective way possible, accounting for the multiple
interests at stake.143
As both history as well as the decisions of courts around the
country inform us, the best way to address the issue of widespread
denial of interruption insurance claims is to simply make sure that
these policies are enforced.144 This can and should be done, as many
courts have held, by striking virus exclusions from these policies,
and similarly concluding that virus and bacteria do not fall under
pollutant exclusions.145 Thus, any final bill should adopt the
language of the proposed federal bills, clearly stating that business
interruption insurance policies must pay out an amount consistent
with the policy in the event of either government-mandated
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shutdowns or COVID-19-related claims.146 Relatedly, for this act to
be effective, it must be, as many of this country’s legislatures have
recognized, retroactive to March 2020 in order to cover the full
scope of the economic fallout from this global pandemic.147
B. Loss-Spreading Mechanisms
While much of the financial burden will still fall to the insurance
companies, it may become impossible for the insurance industry to
cover the immense liability from this magnitude of claims without
becoming insolvent, just as it was post-September 11, when
Congress passed TRIA to address this very issue.148 TRIA has
enjoyed relatively strong political success and has been reauthorized
numerous times since its passage in 2002.149 It is reasonable then to
believe that this success can be emulated in a solution to the same
issue as it exists today under COVID-19, as evidenced by its
backstop mechanism being essentially copied in H.R. 6497.150 Due
to the success and longevity of the federal backstop mechanism
implemented through TRIA, little revision is required in order to
meet the needs of the current pandemic.151 An effective act would
include a provision creating a federal backstop program, which is
essentially a reinsurance program whereby insurance companies can
opt in to pay a premium to the federal government. That premium
would then go into a fund dedicated to paying out the federal share
of business interruption claims. Insurers that participate in this
program would be subject to a deductible like any other insured, but
after meeting their deductible, the federal government would
reimburse insurers 95% of the payments made to customers on these
claims.152 However, the upper cap, beyond which the federal
government will cover all losses, will likely need to be readjusted
146
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for COVID-19. In TRIA, this limit was $100 billion, above which
all losses were realized by the federal government, not the insurance
industry.153 But with estimated liability related to COVID-19 to be
in the hundreds of billions per month, this cap will almost certainly
have to be raised and should be determined by a Federal Advisory
Committee on Insurance established by the Secretary of the
Treasury, as contemplated by H.R. 6497.154
C. Incentive for Private Sector Investment
Although the government and the insurance companies
themselves will have to inevitably front most of the losses and costs
associated with paying out these interruption claims (truly an
unprecedented economic burden), any additional financial support
can greatly reduce these anticipated losses.155 Furthermore, as
discussed earlier, one of the downfalls of a backstop program is the
potentially limitless liability on behalf of the government.156 Any
incentive, therefore, to utilize private capital to reduce this liability
is certainly beneficial—especially when it can benefit those willing
to invest their private capital as well.
While there are a number of ways to incentivize private capital
to invest in troubled markets, perhaps the most effective in this
context would be to waive capital gains taxes on investments placed
into the insurance industry during a specified time period. This
would be effective for a number of reasons. First, and most
importantly, it creates a compelling financial incentive for private
equity funds and individuals to invest into the insurance industry by
saving them from as high as a 20% tax in the event the interest is
held for more than one year.157 It would also result in as high as a
37% tax savings in the event the investment would have fallen under
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the short-term capital gains tax.158 This certainly makes an
investment into this industry more enticing compared to other
industries—many of which are similarly dealing with the economic
fallout of COVID-19—especially when coupled with the fact that
many of these companies have been seeing gradual comebacks from
their March 2020 lows.159 This is true almost universally throughout
the insurance industry.160 March 2020 saw five-year lows in stock
prices for nearly all major U.S. insurance companies. However, all
are recovering in part from those lows, albeit not to the extent of
their pre-COVID value, signaling to investors that there is still room
for further growth and further profits.161 For example, this trend can
be seen in two of the largest insurers in the United States, American
International Group, Inc. and MetLife, Inc. In March of 2020, these
two insurance giants were trading at a low of $18.78 and $23.53,
respectively.162 As of October 2020, these values had climbed back
up to $32.38 and $40.94, but still shy of their pre-COVID 2020 highs
of $54.47 and $52.61, suggesting room for potential continued
further growth.163 This creates ample room for capable investors to
make rational investment choices, with the added bonus that any
returns would be tax free. Additionally, this incentive would likely
not be subject to widespread abuse or tax dodging because
individuals and corporations alike still maintain a financial incentive
to diversify their investments, especially when entering a hurting
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market with potential for losses.164 However, such potential losses
should not scare away relatively well-off investors since the tax
incentives create a solid possibility of above-average returns, and in
the event there are any capital losses, they could nonetheless be used
to reduce taxable income and any capital gains the investor may
have earned in other areas.165 Lastly, although avoidance of a capital
gains tax means the government loses out on potential revenue, this
likely would be accounted for by the fact that these investments are
designed to directly reduce its own financial burden to the insurance
companies. Regardless, such gains likely would never have
materialized at all, absent the tax incentive provided for in the
proposed legislation.
Claims in favor of lowering capital gains tax rates have been
argued in the United States Congress for years, and there is at least
some evidence to suggest that lowering—or in this case
eliminating—the capital gains tax in this limited context will
provide exactly the type of relief necessary to effectively spread the
cost of covering these insurance claims.166 The most important
effects of eliminating capital gains taxes in this context are the
contribution to overall economic growth and crucially, increased
investment in high-risk areas.167 Low or zero tax rates on capital
gains increase the amount of investing done by venture capitalists
and “angel investors,” or those that invest in new or risky
businesses—exactly the type of investors insurance companies
should seek to attract at the moment.168 Although insurance
companies are far from new businesses, they can certainly still be
164
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seen as a risky investment.169 Even though, as mentioned earlier,
there is a case to be made that there is room for growth and
significant returns, there is also substantial uncertainty surrounding
upcoming legislation aimed at the insurance industry170 and just how
much the industry may be required to compensate insureds for their
COVID-19-related losses. These investments, then, are still far from
a sure thing.171
Additional investment into the insurance industry through
venture capitalists and angel investors alike will provide the industry
with much needed capital and should have the immediate effect of
increasing their share prices, as well as encourage the influx of
additional capital from other investors.172 Chris Edwards, the
director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute, argues that lower
capital gains taxes lead to higher economic productivity, resulting
in an expanded economy as well as increased aggregate tax revenue
as a result.173 While advocating for a zero capital gains tax, even in
this limited scope, may seem drastic, similar entreaties have been
advanced since 1997.174 These arguments and other economic
realities led Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve Chairman,
to famously state that “the appropriate capital gains tax was zero.”175
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His primary concerns were that capital gains taxes “impede
entrepreneurial activity and capital formation.”176
Opponents of capital gains tax cuts argue that it does not increase
GDP and that it concentrates the excess capital in the hands of the
wealthiest Americans. These contentions both may have some merit,
but do not take away from the benefits at hand and significantly,
even assuming arguendo that they are true, are not negative enough
to outweigh the potential benefit. Billionaires in America have
added over $1 trillion to their collective net worth since the start of
the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020.177 Interestingly, much of
this increased wealth is attributed to a favorable stock market.178
Clearly then, this is both a profitable and an attractive avenue of
investment for America’s wealthiest individuals, meaning that the
right economic incentive—like a tax elimination—is likely to steer
this capital into the insurance industry, where it can benefit those
struggling from the pandemic, and not just the super-rich.179 Since
this concentration of wealth has already been going on for months
in the context of the pandemic, it makes sense to embrace this reality
and manipulate it in a way that helps insurers stay financially viable
and pay out on more claims, ultimately benefiting small businesses
across the country.180
Another argument those against decreasing capital gains tax cite
is that it is not a major factor in creating economic growth.181 While
it may not be a major factor in economic growth—it is still
nonetheless a factor.182 Moreover, this finding is in the context of a
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tax reduction, not a tax elimination.183 It follows that such a drastic
shift would create a similarly more drastic effect on economic
growth, and even if this increased effect is statistically insignificant,
any growth at such a dire economic time ought to be encouraged.
Furthermore, an inconsequential effect on economic growth as a
whole does not negate the very real benefit of increased investment
into a struggling industry which has the effect of reducing the public
sector’s liability.184 This cuts against the argument that such a tax
elimination simply decreases tax revenue only to create more wealth
for the richest Americans. First, as previously discussed, America’s
wealthiest individuals have already financially benefitted
significantly from the COVID-19 pandemic. For better or worse,
this is an economic reality. Making peace with that reality, a tax
incentive is the best way to ensure those benefits are shared where
small business owners are struggling the most. Second, while the
government misses out on roughly 20–40% of the capital gains in
income, it benefits by saving 100% of the amount of the capital
invested. Since this money is directly invested into insurance
companies, it increases their liquid capital, and reduces the amount
of money they need to borrow from the government to settle their
claims.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 has and continues to wreak havoc on the global
economy.185 Months of mandated closures, decreases in foot traffic,
and additional health considerations and costs have caused over
100,000 American small businesses to close for good.186 Being that
little has changed for small businesses, this trend will almost
certainly continue absent financial intervention, or until vaccines
have been administered to the majority of the population, or the
United States reaches heard immunity.187 The government, as
183
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evidenced in past crises, has the power and ability to alleviate the
economic burden faced by American businesses.188 It can do this
best by empowering the private sector, through the insurance
industry, to shoulder the majority of the burden, while it covers
excessive losses and market failures, to prevent bankrupting an
entire industry. Any solution to this problem must address it in such
a way that protects our insurance institutions and prepares them to
combat the next economic crisis. Although it is, perhaps
understandably, a politically unpopular industry to many, if the
United States were to impose legislation to the benefit of businesses
without considering the rational economic needs of insurance
companies as well, it would do so to the long-term detriment of those
businesses it seeks to protect.
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